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THE SCOPE OF THE 1939 AMENDMENT TO THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
JAMES A. DOOLEY*
ENNYSON majestically said: "The old order changeth, yielding
place to the new." This ancient saying has truth even in the
law. Law is filling in the interstices of life once virgin to it. It
has demonstrated that it has capacity for growth and expansion and
ability to adapt itself to change. As proof, consider that law common-
ly called "the 1939 Amendment" to the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.' Yet, more important, this amendment marks a real change in the
objectives of the law. It illustrates, as perhaps no other single statute,
a change in the law's philosophy, and a recommendation that all
laws, to be effective, must define rights and liabilities in a practicable
manner.
The change in philosophy we speak of is from the court-made
doctrine of Aerkfetz v. Humphreys,2 that growing industry, and rail-
roads in particular, should be protected, shielded and insulated
against human overhead, even though such might mean protection
from the consequences of their own neglect. Then courts viewed
actions to recover damages for personal injuries with the avowed
purpose of defeating recovery. Out of this common purpose there
were generated those court-made defenses of assumption of risk, con-
tributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule. Indeed, even after
the passage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act in 1908, some
of these defenses were paraded in opinions of courts of review, fre-
1 "Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be
the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or
closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the pur-
poses of this chapter, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such com-
merce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter." 53 Stat. 1404
(1939), 45 U.S.C.A. §51 (1954).
2 145 U.S. 418 (1892).
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quently under aliases. Little wonder, indeed, that railroad com-
panies had no desire for a workmen's compensation act prior to
1939 when Congress skewered these defenses in definite language.
Today the law accentuates the rights of the individual. The objec-
tive of the specific acts governing railroad workers is vividly de-
scribed by Mr. Justice Douglas thus:
The purpose of the act was to change that strict rule of liability, to lift from
employees the "prodigious burden" of personal injuries which that system had
placed upon them and to relieve men "who by the exigencies and necessities
of life are bound to labor" from the risks and hazards that could be avoided
or lessened "by the exercise of proper care on the part of the employer in pro-
viding safe and proper machinery and equipment with which the employee
does his work."3
The recognition of the necessity of practicable operation of law
is, we said, found in the 1939 Amendment. Consider, if you will,
this language:
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall
be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall in any way
directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce. . . shall ... be con-
sidered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce .... 4
This is not only clear language, it is language with teeth in it. Note
the frequent use of the word "any" in these phrases: "any employee,"
"any part of whose duties," or "in any way" affect such commerce.
These are expressions which in themselves mean a spreading of the
base of the Act.
Prior to this Amendment the Federal Employers' Liability Act
required that the employee be engaged in interstate commerce at
the moment of injury. The test prior to 1939, which was that laid
down in the case of Shanks v. Delaware L. & W. R.R. Co.,5 was:
The question for decision is, was Shanks at the time of the injury employed
in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Employers' Liability Act?
What his employment was on other occasions is immaterial, for . . .the Act
refers to the service being rendered when the injury was suffered.8
This criterion was known as the "pin point rule." The appellation
was no doubt derived from its deliberate blindness to peripheral
conditions. And, as anyone may well have foreseen, such a test
resulted in a multitude of injustices. The railroad's employee was
8 Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949). 5 239 U.S. 556 (1916).
453 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.A. §51 (1954). 6 Ibid., at 558.
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in theory entitled to the benefits of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. Yet after injury he found himself the subject of a legal tug
of war between the Federal Employers' Liability Act and state work-
men's compensation laws. In cases where the employee had been
injured through the neglect of the company, the employer denied
liability on the ground that the injured was not engaged in inter-
state commerce at the time of his misfortune. Conversely, in cases
where the mishap occurred without negligence, the employee's claim
before a compensation body (if he was fortunate enough to be in
a state where there was a workmen's compensation act) met with
resistance on the ground that he was engaged in interstate commerce
when injured, and thus no state compensation act was applicable.
Such refinements were made as to produce a welter of conflicting
decisions as to what remedy, if any, the injured railroad worker had.
Accordingly, the injured railroad worker-and unfortunately, his
lawyer as well-lived in somewhat of a "no man's land." Whether
the injured's remedy was under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act or according to the terms of some compensation act was always
a poignant question. Frequently, he brought an action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act and did not find that he was not
entitled to the benefits of that Act until some court of last resort
had decided "no interstate." And this, notwithstanding that he
might have spent ninety-five percent of his working moments in
what was undeniably interstate traffic. In the meantime his claim
under a workmen's compensation act, if there was an act in the
state wherein he was employed, became barred by the statute of
limitations. It became a question of pitting workmen's compensation
laws against the Federal Employers' Liability Act, depending upon
what was most effective to defeat recovery. Thus, in cases of culpa-
bility the railroad sought cover on want of interstate commerce.
Likewise, in situations where employees proceeded under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, the trite position of the railroad was that the
Federal Employers' Liability Act governed. Accordingly, the railroad
worker was frequently left in a vacuum, notwithstanding that he was
entirely innocent of the tort which had been committed.
These situations multiplied themselves. They became so numerous,
as the decisions will attest, that it became very questionable whether
the Federal Employers' Liability Act could accomplish the purpose
for which it had been intended, viz., to give those engaged in this
extrahazardous work a particular remedy. Finally, there was
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evolved the 1939 Amendment. The Judiciary Committee of the
United States Senate cited the Shanks case, and appreciated the
difficulties encountered in determining the answer to the then con-
trolling question, as to whether the injured at the moment of occur-
rence was in interstate commerce. After observing that the pre-
ponderance of service performed by all railroad men is interstate in
character, it then boldly stated that the purpose of the Amendment
was to broaden the scope of the Act so as to include within it em-
ployees who, while ordinarily engaged in interstate commerce, may
at the time of injury be divorced therefrom and in intrastate com-
merce. It recognized that railroad men shifted from one class of
service to another, and that they should all enjoy uniform treat-
ment in case of injury. It stated specifically:
The adoption of the proposed Amendment will to a very large extent elimi-
nate the necessity of determining whether an employee at the very instant of
his injury or death was actually engaged in interstate traffic. If any part of the
employee's duties (at the time of his injury or death) directly, closely or sub-
stantially affected interstate or foreign commerce, the plaintiff would be con-
sidered entitled to the benefits of the Act.7
Why do we turn back grandfather's clock in discussing this
Amendment? For a full appreciation of this law, the antecedent con-
ditions, and the purposes it was to attain, must be known. Otherwise
how shall we know what ills it was to remedy?
Today, the question of interstate commerce is a very simple one.
The 1939 Amendment unveiled interstate commerce. It is no longer
a mystery or something to be feared in the trial of an employee's
case. Familiarity with it belongs to any who will give it some study.
It is not, as it had been regarded in the past, some hidden truth
the revelation of which only a few enjoyed. Stated as simply as the
Act makes it, the test is: Did the employee have any duties which
furthered interstate commerce? Did he in any way affect interstate
commerce? If but one of these queries is answered "Yes," he comes
within the Act although he might have been engaged in work of a
purely intrastate character at the time of injury. As Judge Walter
Lindley, who spent a lifetime in federal courts, observed:
Congress' intent to include any employee who performs services which in
any way further or affect interstate commerce is clear. 8
7 Report of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, 76th Congress,
1st Session (Committee Report No. 1661, upon 1708).
8 Edwards v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 131 F. 2d 366, 369 (C.A. 7th, 1942).
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Because all of us cling to the past, because all of us to a certain
degree dislike change, the courts at first felt it difficult to compre-
hend the limitless bounds of this Amendment. The avenues of remedy
it opened were unknown to the law. However, today the Amend-
ment enjoys matured interpretation.
As is indicated from a consideration of the situations which we
shall consider, the Amendment did not bring under the Act em-
ployees solely engaged in intrastate commerce. As was pointed out:
All the Amendment did was to mark the line to which the Federal Act
might be extended, as to a matter about which there was much uncertainty
and confusion. If the Congress could constitutionally enact the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, . . . then, necessarily, it may clarify and make effective
the terms and the application thereof. .. .9
Thus, view the situations now within the act: The injured em-
ployed as a road foreman by a railroad located solely in one county,
while returning home in a handcar after working on a switch over
which his employer's cars passed in delivering coal from mines to
another carrier which took the cargo beyond the state;' ° a section
crew member sent on a six-mile trip, in a truck owned by a third
party, for the purpose of getting tools; a lumber inspector in-
jured while inspecting ties on a loading dock of a lumber company
before purchase by the railroad company which shipped some of
the ties inspected by him to other states and used some of them on
its main line and as replacements; 12 an all around laborer and cleaner,
filling barrels of oil to be used in filling lanterns and oil cans used in
oiling railroad engines and machines; 3 a brakeman being transported
on a company conveyance after leaving his train, one car of which
was in interstate commerce ;14 a signal man repairing lighting fix-
tures of a railroad station; 15 a maid at a terminal;' a laborer loading
posts to be used in repairing a roadway; 17 a railroad's emergency
9 Pritt v. West Virginia N. R. Co., 132 W. Va. 184, 194, 51 S.E. 2d, 105, 114 (1948);
certiorari denied, 336 U.S. 961 (1949).
10 Riley v. West Va. No. Ry. Co., 132 W. Va. 208, 51 S.E. 2d 119 (1948).
11 Patsaw v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 56 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. La., 1944).
12 Ericksen v. Southern Pacific Co., 39 C. 2d 374, 246 P. 2d 642 (1952).
13 Harris v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 158 Kan. 679, 149 P. 2d 342 (1944).
14 Northwestem Pacific Ry. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 73 C.A. 2d 367,
166 P. 2d 334 (1946).
15 Scarborough v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 154 Pa. Super. 129, 35 A. 2d 603 (1944).
16 Albright v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 183 Md. 421, 37 A. 2d 870 (1944).
17 Rainwater v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 207 La. 681, 21 S. 2d 872 (1945).
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flood control worker whose job was to fill sandbags, place them on
a flat car destined to move over the tracks used for movement in
interstate commerce, the bags being placed along the tracks to pro-
tect them from flood waters;' a locomotive fireman on a train en-
gaged in moving empty coal cars which had come from outside the
state to coal mines in the state where they were to be loaded and
transported to other states. 19
Contrast is always the effective medium to compare the present
with the past. What are the contrasts in this phase of the law? Since
we cannot consider all of them, we shall "point to a few lodestars," as
Mr. Justice Rutledge would say.
Under the old rule, once an instrumentality was withdrawn from
interstate commerce, anyone working about it was not within the Act.
But the Missouri Appellate Court, in a case where a boilermaker's
helper in the railroad's shop, wherein heavy repairs were being done
on an engine removed from service on June 10, 1945, brought into the
shop June 25, 1945, and after 24 days returned to interstate service,
held this to be within the Act when he sustained injuries while
working on the engine in the shop.20 The court reasoned that since
the locomotive was destined to return to interstate service as soon
as it had been repaired, the plaintiff was affecting interstate com-
merce.
Where the plaintiff employed as a repairman at the railroad shops
doing what is known as "back shop repairs" with repairing instru-
mentalities withdrawn from interstate commerce, it was declared
within the Act by the New York Court of Appeals, the court reason-
ing that his duties affected interstate commerce. 21 So also has a black-
smith's helper engaged in making locomotive parts been held to be
entitled to the benefits of the Act.22
To the extent that the Act brings within it almost all employees,
consider that situation where the decedent was employed in a round-
house as a member of a repair crew and while repairing a stall be-
18 Skanks v. Union Pacific R. Co., 155 Kan. 584, 127 P. 2d 431 (1942).
19 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328, 182 S.W. 2d 447 (1944).
20 Wheeler v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 205 S.W. 2d 906 (Mo. App., 1947).
21 Baird v. New York Central R. Co., 299 N.Y. 213, 86 N.E. 2d 567 (1949). In Shel-
ton v. Thomson, the court said, "A car cannot travel even in interstate commerce
without wheels." 148 F. 2d 1, 3 (C.A. 7th, 1945).
2 2Trucco v. Erie R. Co., 353 Pa. 320, 45 A. 2d 20 (1946).
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came electrocuted.23 Parenthetically, it should be noted that this case
also holds that a signed stipulation by the widow as well as the hear-
ing held by a state industrial board which entered an order award-
ing compensation was not an adjudication of the character of dece-
dent's work and that an action could be maintained under the Act.
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CONSTRUCTION
AND REPAIR WORK IS NOW NONEXISTENT
The old rule was that when an employee was engaged in con-
struction work he was not in interstate commerce, but while doing
repair or maintenance work about an instrumentality used in inter-
state commerce he was entitled to the benefits of the Act.24 Ap-
parently, the rationale of this rule was that the object being con-
structed could not be an instrumentality of interstate commerce
until it had been dedicated by actual use. Yet today that old rule
has died with the Amendment. Thus, an employee injured on the
third day of his employment, while laying rails on a new railroad
bed which had not yet been used, came within the Act since dur-
ing the first two days of his work he had worked on the main line
of the railroad which was an instrumentality of interstate commerce.26
Also interesting is the case of the trackman who was injured while
spreading cinders and ballast in surfacing tracks which had just
been laid. However, not until thirty days later were the tracks upon
which he was working used in interstate traffic. The court was of
the opinion that it was just as necessary to place rails as it was to
replace them, and that the work furthered and affected interstate
commerce.
2 6
But on the other hand the Supreme Court of Idaho, in a three-to-
two opinion, held that an employee who sprained his back while
working on a new track was entitled to compensation benefits under
the state act and did not come within the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act.27 The probable reason for the decision is that the court
did not want to leave the injured remediless. If it were held that
he came within the Federal Employers' Liability Act, he would have
2 3 Zimmermann v. Scandrett, 57 F. Supp. 799 (E.D. Wis., 1944).
24 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177 (1916).
25 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Fisher, 206 Ark. 705, 177 S.W. 2d 725 (1944).
26 Agostino v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 50 F. Supp. 726 (E.D.N.Y., 1943).
27 Moser v. Union Pacific R. Co., 65 Idaho 479, 147 P. 2d 336 (1944).
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no case. This is an example of the truth of the saying that a "hard
case makes bad law."
INJURY ARISING FROM A SERIES OF INJURIES
Most tort lawyers are inclined to feel that the injury resulting
from a tort must flow from the particular tort itself or be inherent
in its consequences, such as subsequent falls because of a leg injury in
a single accident, or mistakes by physicians in diagnosis and treat-
ment. Here, however, the injury need not grow out of a single
occurrence. An action may be maintained to recover for a condition
of ill being resulting from a series of incidents or a continuous wrong.
These decisions have their origin in the language of the Act. But
we believe their taproot is in the 1939 Amendment which, together
with a fairminded Supreme Court, brought home to the inferior
courts not only the purpose of the Act but also the fear that unless
it fostered those purposes, certiorari would be granted.
Most interesting, indeed, is the case of a sorefooted switchman.
His feet had either become sore or diseased as the result of his
alighting upon gravel and rock over a period of ninety days. The
defendant urged that the condition came about gradually and not by
any specific incident and that there was no "injury" within the
meaning of the Act. The Texas court pointed out that there was
nothing in the Act requiring an injury to occur on a specific date
or to arise from any specific occurrence.28
One of the real landmarks in the history of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act is the case of Urie v. Thompson.29 There the plaintiff
had been exposed to silicosis which had resulted from many years'
exposure at the same work. This was an "injury" within the Act,
since plaintiff-employee alleged and proved that the defendant-em-
ployer failed to properly adjust the sanders on its locomotives. The
court stated:
The question remains whether silicosis is an "injury" within the meaning of
that term as used in the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It is a novel one for
this Court. But we think silicosis is within the statute's coverage when it re-
sults from the employer's negligence.8 0
28 Kansas C.S. Ry. Co. v. Chandler, 192 S.W. 2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App., 1945).
29 337 U.S. 163 (1949). It was contended that the plaintiff must have contracted
silicosis as a matter of law more than three years prior to filing suit; to do so would
be to make his remedy illusive. This the court would not do. It was also pointed out
that, although the inhalations took place over a period of years prior to the 1939
Amendment, there was no assumption of risk.
30 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949).
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Considerations arising from the breadth of the statutory language,
the Act's humanitarian purposes, its accepted standard of liberal con-
struction to accomplish those objects, the absence of anything in
the legislative history indicating a Congressional intent to require a
restricted interpretation or expressly to exclude such occupational
disease, and the trend of existing authorities dealing with the ques-
tion, combine to support this conclusion of the soundness of the Urie
doctrine.
Dermatitis is now a condition for which there may be recovery
under the terms of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. This is, of
course, the result of the Urie decision. Indeed, it would appear that
if silicosis is remediable, dermatitis should likewise be recognized as an
occupational disease.
The first case was that of a dining car waiter who sustained a
contact dermatitis allegedly caused by the use of three well-known
products supplied by his employer for cleansing and sterilizing din-
ing car equipment. The trial court set aside a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, but the Court of Appeals, in reversing this judgment, rea-
soned that the jury might well have found that the use of the three
cleaning agents created a risk of injury to the plaintiff which a
reasonable person would have guarded against, and that the defendant
did not take such measures to guard against that risk as would have
been employed by a reasonably prudent man. Recovery was allowed
although there was no finding that any other employee of the rail-
road had even been similarly affected, and there was evidence that
the cleansing products in question were widely used for the same
purpose for which the railroad employed them.3 '
The significance of this decision is that no notice, constructive or
actual, was shown by plaintiff. The court was adopting the thoughts
expressed in the Urie case, to-wit:
When the employer's negligence impairs or destroys an employee's health by
requiring him to work under conditions likely to bring about such harmful con-
sequences, the injury to the employee is just as great when it follows, often in-
evitably, from a carrier's negligent course pursued over an extended period of
time as when it comes with the suddenness of lightning. 32
Likewise, we find that inspectors suffering from dermatitis as a
result of coming into contact with diesel fuel oil and lubricating oil
in the servicing and inspection of locomotives are allowed to re-
31 Young v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 197 F. 2d 727 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
32 337 U.S. 163, 186 and 187 (1949).
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cover. In an Illinois case, recovery was affirmed on the basis that
the defendant failed to use reasonable precautions, discoverable by
the exercise of ordinary care, to prevent the inspector from the
occupational hazard in his work in and about diesel fuel and lubri-
cating oils. Here, however, although the disease was contracted in
1947, there was some evidence of constructive knowledge on the
part of the defendant in 1951 as to the dangers inherent in the use
of such fuels.88
Today, it may be said that the employer is presumed to be
familiar with the dangers hidden, as well as open, which ordinarily
acccompany the business in which he is engaged. Such was the
reasoning when recovery was allowed where the deceased died as
a result of poisoning monoxide gas arising from the hot ashes in
a pit.34
WHEN IS ONE AN EMPLOYEE WITHIN THE ACT?
Although it had been held prior to 1939 that an employee's duties
include not only actual service but also those things necessarily inci-
dent thereto, such as going to and from the place of employment on
the employer's premises,3 the 1939 Amendment has its effect here,
too. Prior to the passage of the Amendment, only those whose work
was of an interstate character at the time of injury were afforded
this protection. Today, anyone, who if injured while actually work-
ing would be held to be within the 1939 Amendment, is entitled to
the Act's benefits.
In considering this question as to when a person is employed (the
term "scope of employment" is disliked since it is foreign to the
Act), the courts have adopted the liberal attitude. Consider the case
of the worker who, on a day prior. to the day he was injured did
not work and about whose subsequent work there was some ques-
33Crowley v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 1 111. App. 2d 481, 117 N.E. 2d 843 (1954).
34 Baumgartner v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 292 Pa. 106, 108, 140 Ad. 622, 624 (1928).
The court there said, ..... and the master is presumed to know the nature and quali-
ties of the materials he places in the hands of his servants. In other words, he is pre-
sumed to have such knowledge of matters pertaining to his business as is possessed by
those having special acquaintance with the subjects involved. ... An employer is pre-
sumed to be familiar with the dangers latent, as well as patent, ordinarily accompany-
ing the business in which he is engaged."
35Erie R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170 (1917); North Carolina R.R. Co. v.
Zachary, 232 U.S. 248 (1914).
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tion, was injured while sleeping in a place adjacent to the right of
way when a switch engine struck him. He had attempted to sleep
in a tank car furnished him by the railroad but vermin drove him
out. This was held an incident of his employment.
In another situation, where the day's work of the section hand
consisted in laboring on a track of the railroad used in interstate com-
merce and where he lived in a shanty and was subject to call at
night, the fact that he was injured by the explosion of an oil lamp
in the shanty, while waiting to leave for a week-end at home, gave
him a right of action under the Act."'
Thus, it is readily appreciated how the 1939 amendment affects
the question of recovery for injuries occurring under circumstances
incidental to employment. It broadens the interpretation of what
is or is not incidental for the reason that the base of the Act itself
is broadened so as to bring within its confines those who were be-
yond the pale prior to 1939.
UNUSUAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACT
Notwithstanding that the Act is couched in the simplest language,
notwithstanding that the Supreme Court has repeatedly commented
that it is interpreted liberally to achieve its humanitarian purposes,
notwithstanding its interpretation is to be determined by federal and
not local law, we have some heretical interpretations on the books.
Let us examine but a few.
In the Moser case, which has already been discussed, where the
employee sprained his back when engaged in work on a new track,
and the Industrial Commission of Idaho awarded him compensation,
the Supreme Court affirmed the award in its three-to-two opinion.
This we have pointed out was probably the result of a judicial effort
to see that he was not remediless.
In Illinois, the evil began in 1942 with a case wherein the injured
sought compensation. There, a railroad patrolman was injured while
ejecting trespassers. Although a part of his duty was to inspect inter-
state cars for broken seals and to observe the conditions of the tracks
over which interstate commerce ran, the court, to overrule the rail-
road's claim, held that the test of the applicability of the 1939 Amend-
ment was whether the activity in which any employee is engaged
at the time of the accident directly or closely and substantially af-
86 Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. Meeks, 30 Tenn. App. 520, 208 S.W. 2d 355 (1947).
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fects interstate commerce.37 This ruling, probably engendered by
desire to award compensation, does violence to the Amendment it-
self. It ignores completely the clause, "any part of whose duties"
shall affect interstate commerce. It ignores completely the Congres-
sional intendment. As a result of that decision, the same court, eight
years later in the case of Ernhart v. Elgin, 1. & E. Ry. Co.,"8 when
confronted with the case of a conductor of a switching crew whose
duties were both inter- and intrastate in character, but sustained an
injury while engaged in an intrastate movement, adhered to the nar-
row view. In affirming a recovery by the employee, it held that the
intrastate functions of a switching crew affect interstate commerce.
This, of course, is a violent process of reasoning and at loggerheads
with the federal decisions.
In 1952, the same question came before the Illinois Supreme Court
in the case of Walden v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co.89 There
the decedent, a carpenter foreman, was killed when he fell from a
highway bridge over which vehicles passed and under which were
the yards of the railroad wherein trains moved in interstate com-
merce. The decedent spent perhaps seventy percent of his working
time in what was admittedly interstate work, such as maintenance
and repair of interstate instrumentalities. The Appellate Court paid
no heed to this, and held simply that he was not in interstate con-
merce at the time of his injury, relying upon decisions decided be-
fore the passage of the very important 1939 Amendment to the effect
that one engaged in the maintenance of a railroad bridge was not in
interstate commerce.40
The Supreme Court adhered to its prior "pin point" interpreta-
tion of the Amendment and reversed the Appellate Court, not on
the basis of the man's prior activities, but for the reason that the
maintenance and repair of a highway bridge over its switch yard
was done to facilitate the flow and movement of interstate com-
merce traffic in the yards below. Although the widow received her
award, the court overlooked an opportunity to cut itself free from
its two prior interpretations of the Amendment.
37 Thomson v. Industrial Comm., 308 Ill. 386, 44 N.E. 2d 19 (1942).
88 405 Ill. 577, 92 N.E. 2d 96 (1950).
89 411 Ill. 378, 104 N.E. 2d 240 (1952).
4 0 Hallstein v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 30 F. 2d 594 (C.A. 6th, 1929); Montgomery v.
Terminal R.R. Assn., 335 Mo. 348, 73 S.W. 2d 236 (1934), certiorari denied 293 U.S.
602 (1934).
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THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Prior to the 1939 Amendment, there was a specific provision of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act concerning assumption of risks.
It read thus:
In any action brought against a common carrier under or by virtue of any
of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for injuries to, or death
of, any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have assumed the
risks of his employment in any case where the violation by such common
carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the
injuries or death of such employee. 41
However, in August, 1939, this section was amended so that after
the words, "of his employment in any case," the following words
were added: "where such injury or death resulted in whole or in part
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier; and no employee shall be held to have assumed the risks
of his employment in any case. "42
Indeed, even after the passage of the 1939 Amendment, the courts
held that the defense of assumption of risk, as abolished by para-
graph 4 of the Act,48 was applicable only where the negligence of
the carrier is in violation of some statute enacted for the safety of
employees and that the defense was still available not only as to
ordinary risks inherent in the business, but also as to secondary risks
arising from abnormal dangers caused by the employer's negligence.
Such was the holding of the Court of Appeals on May 19, 1942, in
the Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry." case involving an accidental
death which occurred in March, 1940. But how the United States
Supreme Court destroyed at a single thrust this opinion of the Court
of Appeals and the mode of thinking it represented, is now history.
Echoes of Justice Black's famous words that "every vestige of the
doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated from the law by the
1939 Amendment ' 4 are found in the opinions of other courts.
The late Mr. Justice Rutledge in describing the serpentine force
with which the application of this doctrine destroyed the employee's
remedy includes many thoughts of Mr. Justice Black, whose concept
41 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C.A. S54 (1954).
4253 Star. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.A. S54 (1954).
43 Ibid.
44 128 F. 2d 420 (C.A. 4th, 1942). Cause of action March 20, 1940, decision March 3,
1942, reversed in 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
45 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.A. S54 (1954).
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of the various defenses engrafted by courts onto the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act is unexcelled. He tells us:
But under Employers' Liability Act prior to 1939 there was inescapable rea-
son for making accurate differentiation of the three [assumption of risk, con-
tributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule have each produced its sig-
nal]. . . . Assumption of risk remained for defense to liability. Contributory
negligence merely reduced the damages. The fellow-servant rule was abolished.
These distinct consequences required distinct treatment of the three con-
ceptions. This meant that so far as assumption of risk, which remained a com-
plete defense, had swallowed up contributory negligence and the fellow-servant
rule, the latter, having different effects, should be withdrawn from its enfold-
ing embrace. In that way only could the clear legislative mandate be carried
out and the distinct consequences attributed by it to each be attained. To per-
mit assumption of risk still to engulf all the proper territory of contributory
negligence and the fellow-servant rule would be only and plainly to nullify
Congress' command. 46
Thus, a fair appraisal of the 1939 Amendment, widening the base
of the Act, as it did, destroyed the defense of assumption of risk,
by whatever name it may be called, means that the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act can operate at the human level where accom-
plishment of its purposes is possible. It stands out today among all
other types of legislation as the only law which gives an injured em-
ployee a true remedy.
Now we have attained an implement which can be very good. We
must keep it. Indeed, if Senator Norris, the great pioneer of the Act,
were with us today, he would consider apropos that slogan of a
political party employed in the 1952 elections: "Don't let them take
it away from you."
The prime objective of all law is to solve problems confronting
the everyday life of man. Thus, if any law is to be practicable, it must
be realistic; it must be cognizant of the realities of life.
Time moves on and does so with its own pruning knife. Sometimes
obstacles are abated and sometimes they are created. The law, it
seems, always lags behind.
The 1939 Amendment is a superb effort to make a law practicable.
With the steel of reality, it has clipped the wings of mere theory out
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. At last one of the squeakiest
wheels in the administration of justice has received some grease.
46 Owens v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 319 U.S. 715, 721 (1943).
